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Article 
Taobao, Federalism, and the Emergence of 
Law, Chinese Style 
Lizhi Liu∗ & Barry R. Weingast† 
  INTRODUCTION   
When a startup in the West invents a new form of consumer 
electronics and creates a website from which to sell its products, 
all of national law stands behind it, helping to reduce various 
forms of fraud, theft, and encroachment on intellectual property. 
Similarly, disputes that arise between the firm and its custom-
ers, suppliers, or competitors are negotiated in a rich legal and 
commercial environment. Because China lacks a strong legal in-
frastructure,1 a similar venture attempting to sell by website is 
far riskier. The inchoate, variable, and sometimes corrupt na-
ture of the Chinese legal system makes the prevention and res-
olution of legal problems much harder.2 Chinese startups and 
small and medium firms that sell products by their own website 
are considerably more vulnerable than similar ventures in Eu-
rope or the United States. 
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 1. See SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN 
CHINA 1–7 (1993) (discussing the government’s persistent refusal to create legal 
institutions in China). 
 2. Id. 
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Enter Taobao (which means “searching for treasure”), an 
online trading platform that hosts over 400 million active trad-
ers.3 Created by Alibaba, Taobao is China’s largest online trad-
ing platform.4 At first glance, Taobao’s online trading platform 
appears to be the Chinese version of eBay or Amazon. As with 
these popular American online-trading sites, Taobao serves as 
an exchange mechanism matching buyers and sellers.5 We ar-
gue, however, that Taobao is far more. It has begun to develop 
many aspects of market infrastructure that the Chinese govern-
ment has been unwilling or unable to provide;6 that is, it has 
been forced to create law. To clarify, this is not to say that Ama-
zon or eBay have no rules governing exchange, dispute, and 
fraud. Rather, the underlying legal environment in China com-
pared to Western countries differs so considerably that online 
trading platforms in China must be far more developed in their 
legal functions than Western analogs in order to sustain a func-
tioning market. As this legal function of Taobao has become 
more complex and systematic, the central government appears 
to have acquiesced in Taobao’s assertion of authority to experi-
ment with various components of private law, including con-
tracts, property rights relevant to the platform, prevention of 
theft and fraud, and especially the resolution of disputes.7 
Taobao’s efforts to create law address a perennial problem 
facing most developing countries, including China: How to foster 
market transactions in the absence of strong formal institu-
tions—in particular, those indispensable to the rule of law? The 
path for the West, which involved parliaments and independent 
 
 3. See ALIBABA HOLDING GRP., LTD., ALIBABA FISCAL REPORT (2016) 
http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/press_pdf/p160505.pdf (showing that in 
fiscal year 2016, Taobao hosted more than ten million active sellers and 423 
million active buyers). In this paper, we use Taobao to refer to both Taobao.com 
and its spinoff site, Tmall.com. Alibaba owns both sites and both have nearly 
identical institutional arrangements. Tmall.com hosts fewer, but larger, busi-
nesses and brands because it is the business-to-consumer version of Taobao.com.  
 4. Thomas DiFonzo, What is Taobao?, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2014), https:// 
www.wsj.com/video/what-is-taobao/69BD4B54-0417-4075-A54D 
-5FC895B5B3F3.html. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra Parts I, III.B (discussing, in Part I, why the Chinese govern-
ment has been unable to or unwilling to develop aspects of market infrastruc-
ture and showcasing, in Part III, how Taobao provides a private substitute for 
state-provided market infrastructure). 
 7. Tao Bao Wang Ge Xiang Wei Gui Kou Fen Hui Zong (淘宝网各项违规扣
分汇总) [Rules for Punishment on Taobao], (淘宝) TAOBAO (Jan. 21, 2014) [here-
inafter Rules for Punishment], https://rule.taobao.com/detail-143.htm. 
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judiciaries, often proves to be too politically constraining to du-
plicate in the developing world.8 The case of China’s thriving 
online market, however, suggests that it has taken a considera-
bly different path from that of the West. 
In this Article, we propose that an alternative approach to 
establishing legal market infrastructure has emerged in China. 
We call this approach “law, Chinese style.” We argue that facing 
tremendous political barriers to establishing legal market infra-
structure, the state can effectively transfer a part of the devel-
opment of law to private actors that are limited in scope. Using 
as context China’s e-commerce market, we observe a private 
building of legal market infrastructure sponsored by online plat-
forms. We argue that Taobao is not simply an exchange platform, 
but one in the process of developing a modern legal system that 
enforces contracts, resolves disputes and prevents fraud. As a 
private supplier of market legal infrastructure when formal in-
stitutions are lacking, Taobao essentially provides a means for 
creating law, Chinese style. 
The development of law, Chinese style, parallels previous 
instances where the central government delegated reform au-
thority during the reform period from the early 1980s through 
the early 1990s.9 In part, our argument builds on important 
precedents for the private development of law when economic 
agents in a range of markets provided private rules and adjudi-
cation mechanisms, such as the diamond and cotton industries,10 
cattle ranchers,11 nineteenth-century settlers on the American 
 
 8. See SHIRK, supra note 1, at 333–37. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contrac-
tual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 155–57 (1992); 
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coop-
eration Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1736–
45 (2001). 
 11. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SET-
TLE DISPUTES 22–28 (1991). 
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frontier,12 medieval merchants,13 pirates,14 nineteenth-century 
American railroads,15 and stock exchanges.16 
To expound the argument, we identify a parallel between 
the law, Chinese style that we currently observe, and “federal-
ism, Chinese style,” that helped create markets in China’s early 
reforms (1980s–1993).17 We argue that both serve as institu-
tional underpinnings for markets and economic growth in the 
absence of a strong, public legal system. Both approaches involve 
the delegation of a limited set of institutional functions from the 
central government to certain domestic actors: in federalism, 
Chinese style, the central government delegated reform author-
ity to local governments;18 and in the case of law, Chinese style, 
the central government has in effect offloaded legal functions to 
platforms.19 We further suggest that the political logic of delega-
tion is consistent for both cases. 
In addition to the parallels identified above, both forms of 
delegation involve the ability to affect the institutional structure 
of the state. In federalism, Chinese style, provinces gained au-
thority to reform and change policies, but also to experiment 
with institutional features of the state in the form of subnational 
governments.20 In law, Chinese style, platforms have asserted 
authority to affect legal institutions. One of the weak aspects of 
federalism, Chinese style, has been the lack of the common mar-
ket condition. The central government has been unable to ensure 
the mobility of products and factors across provincial borders, 
and many of the interior provinces have erected internal trade 
 
 12. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 3–12 (1956). 
 13. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECON-
OMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 309–12 (2006); Paul R. Milgrom et al., 
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private 
Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 4–6 (1990). 
 14. See PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS 
OF PIRATES 45–81 (2009). 
 15. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REV-
OLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 175–88 (1977); JAMES W. ELY, RAILROADS AND 
AMERICAN LAW 155–56 (2002). 
 16. EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER 
IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE 61–78 (2015). 
 17. Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Ba-
sis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50, 52 (1995). 
 18. Id. at 61–63. 
 19. Id. (detailing how different provinces had the authority to approve or 
deny projects that would usually require outside legal approval). 
 20. Id. at 79–81. 
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barriers.21 As a national market, Taobao holds the promise of 
breaking down internal trade barriers erected by the provinces. 
Local governments currently lack effective means to regulate 
market platforms. 
In Part I, we discuss the importance of legal infrastructure 
for the development of markets, and the common political obsta-
cles that prevent developing states from establishing legal infra-
structure. Part II discusses federalism, Chinese style, a previous 
phase of delegation in the early reform period. Part III provides 
the necessary background on Taobao, its platform operation, and 
its legal creation. We then, in Part IV, analyze Taobao’s effect on 
the national common market, and on China’s institutional struc-
ture of economic governance. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL MARKET 
INFRASTRUCTURE   
The process of development involves building a set of legal 
infrastructure to support efficient markets, including commer-
cial law, contract enforcement, and secure property rights.22 
Law is central to the prevention of fraud, the resolution of 
disputes, and, generally, to foster agents to act within the rules. 
Adam Smith, the father of economics and author of the monu-
mental Wealth of Nations,23 recognized the importance of legal 
underpinnings for markets over two centuries ago. Without law, 
Smith explained, “men are continually afraid of the violence of 
their superiors, they frequently bury and conceal a great part of 
their stock.”24 Smith suggested that to solve this problem, “[l]it-
tle else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opu-
lence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a 
 
 21. See Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 65; Chenggang Xu, The Funda-
mental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE 1076 (2011). 
 22. See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE 
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 70–95 (2012); Barry R. 
Weingast, Adam Smith’s Theory of Violence and the Political Economics of De-
velopment, in ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE ROOTS OF DEVELOP-
MENT 51, 63–65, 74 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis eds., 2017); 
Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property 
Rights, Taxation, and Politics, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1218, 1218–44 (2009). 
 23. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R. H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1981) (1776) 
[hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS]. 
 24. Id. at 285. 
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tolerable administration of justice.”25 But how is a tolerable ad-
ministration of justice established? 
The Western approach to legal development involved legis-
latures and independent judiciaries, often with jurisdiction over 
both public and private law.26 Courts came to protect various cit-
izen rights and are one of many checks against government pre-
dation.27 These institutions—all backed by strong, explicit con-
stitutional foundations—ultimately constrain executive 
discretion.28 
But for developing countries, following the Western path of 
legal development has proven to be remarkably difficult.29 The 
main challenge is not the lack of technical knowledge, but a va-
riety of political obstacles that prevents developing countries 
from providing legal market infrastructure through formal 
means.30 For example, Acemoglu and Robinson observe that var-
ious innovations, including a legal system, are likely to make in-
cumbent political officials worse off (e.g., by raising the likeli-
hood they will be replaced).31 Incumbents are therefore reluctant 
to foster a legal system that they cannot control.32 Similarly, 
Cox, North, and Weingast argue that, in all developing countries 
there exist powerful groups with the potential to threaten the 
regime. 33  Regimes typically buy these groups’ cooperation 
through privileges.34 An effective legal system typically threat-
ens these groups, and so they will not support it.35 Therefore, 
 
 25. DUGALD STEWART, Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, 
LL.D., in 7 THE WORKS OF DUGALD STEWART 64 (Hilliard & Brown 1829) (1827). 
 26. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 167–75 (1960). 
 27. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Com-
mitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-
Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 812–14 (1989). 
 28. See F.A. HAYEK, supra note 26, at 212–14. 
 29. See Barry R. Weingast, Why Developing Countries Prove So Resistant 
to the Rule of Law, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 28, 50 
(James J. Heckman et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Weingast, Developing Coun-
tries]. 
 30. See id. at 46–49. 
 31. See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Economic Backwardness in 
Political Perspective, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 129 (2006). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Gary W. Cox et al., The Violence Trap: A Political-Economic Ap-
proach to the Problems of Development 1–3 (Sept. 2017) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with authors); see also Weingast, Developing Countries, supra 
note 29, at 46–47. 
 34. See Weingast, Developing Countries, supra note 29, at 50.  
 35. Id. at 46. 
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rulers of developing states find it difficult to establish the rule of 
law necessary to support thriving, competitive markets.36 
Political obstacles intrinsic to the developing world lead to 
an undersupply of legal market infrastructure.37 In the case of 
China, the steadfast refusal of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to impose direct constitutional constraints necessary for a 
legal system has foreclosed the Western route to legal develop-
ment through an independent court system and the rule of law.38 
The question becomes: How to foster market growth in the ab-
sence of a strong, preexisting or newly emerging public legal sys-
tem? China’s path to economic development has indicated at 
least two potential solutions: federalism, Chinese style, which 
was the philosophy behind China’s early reforms in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and law, Chinese style, the philosophy behind the 
changes we currently observe. 
II.  FEDERALISM, CHINESE STYLE: DELEGATION AND 
THE ORIGINS OF CHINESE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
REFORM, 1981–1993   
In China’s early reforms between the early 1980s and 1993, 
federalism, Chinese style, provided an institutional underpin-
ning for China’s spectacular growth in the absence of a rule-of-
law system.39 China’s political system during this period shared 
much in common with Western federalism, especially that of 
nineteenth-century United States, as the Chinese central gov-
 
 36. See id. at 46–47; Cox et al., supra note 33, at 20–21. 
 37. This does not mean that developing countries do not have legal systems 
or would never engage in legal reforms. But due to the political obstacles afore-
mentioned, their legal systems are often cumbersome, corrupt and beset with 
enforcement problems. 
 38. The Chinese government has long resisted the Western-style rule of law. 
For example, Zhou Qiang, head of the Supreme People’s Court, made this point 
forcefully in a speech to legal officials: “We should resolutely resist erroneous 
influence from the West: ‘constitutional democracy,’ ‘separation of powers’ and 
‘independence of the judiciary.’ . . . We must make clear our stand and dare to 
show the sword.” Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independ-
ent Judiciary, and Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou 
-qiang.html. 
 39. See Hehui Jin et al., Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese Style, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1719, 1721–22 (2005); Montinola et 
al., supra note 17, at 51–53; Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a 
Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 86–88 
(1997). 
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ernment allowed provincial and local governments to have pri-
mary control over economic matters within their jurisdictions.40 
The key of federalism, Chinese style, is a combination of the 
delegation of reform authority from the central to local govern-
ments, high-powered fiscal incentives for local governments, and 
active experimentation by local governments. In the following, 
we briefly go over each component of federalism, Chinese style.  
Perhaps the most significant reform steps taken by the Chi-
nese central government were its delegation of authority from 
the central to local governments. It did so in a series of steps, the 
first allowing Guangdong Province the ability to undertake mar-
ket reform “one step ahead” of other provinces, and then allow-
ing the latter to reform as well.41 This process of decentralization 
granted provincial and local governments a wide range of au-
thority within their own jurisdictions to make economic poli-
cies.42 Foreign capital, for example, flowed into businesses and 
projects that were not controlled by the central government.43 
Coupled with the delegation of authority from the central to 
local governments were high-powered fiscal incentives for local 
governments to compete with one another. The fiscal system 
during this period allowed provinces and lower governments to 
capture a substantial portion of marginal tax revenue generated 
within their jurisdictions.44 
Starting in 1980, China implemented a fiscal revenue-sharing system 
between any two adjacent levels of governments. Although schemes 
var[ied] across both regions and time, the basic idea [was] that a lower-
level regional government contract[ed] with the upper-level regional 
 
 40. Also in parallel with nineteenth-century American states, the Chinese 
reform provided a partial basis for a special kind of federalism called market-
preserving federalism, which provided considerable political protection for the 
reforms—including limits on the central government—and produced remarka-
ble growth. For more discussion, see Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of 
Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Develop-
ment, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 21–24 (1995) (comparing, as others have done, 
federalism, Chinese style, with federalism in Industrial Revolution-era Eng-
land). 
 41. See SHIRK, supra note 1, at 166–68; Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 
61–63. 
 42. See Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 62–63. 
 43. “The total foreign investment [that] China [attracted] increased from 
$4.5 billion in 1985 to $19.2 billion in 1992 . . . . [Meanwhile,] the share of for-
eign investment [controlled] by provinces (rather than ministries of the central 
government) increased from 35 percent in 1985 to 68 percent in 1992.” Id. at 62. 
 44. This system was maintained until the end of 1993, when another round 
of reform centralized the fiscal system. Christine P.W. Wong, Central-Local Re-
lations Revisited: The 1994 Tax Sharing Reform and Public Expenditure Man-
agement in China, CHINA PERSP., Oct.–Sept. 2000, at 52, 54–55. 
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government on the total amount . . . of tax and profit revenue . . . to be 
remitted for the next several years; the lower-level government ke[pt] 
the rest [of the tax and profit revenue].45 
These new fiscal arrangements “induce[d] a strong positive rela-
tionship between local revenue and local economic prosperity . . . 
thus providing local officials with . . . incentive[s] to foster pros-
perity.”46 
With both significant authority over their jurisdictions and 
considerable incentives to develop their own economies, local 
governments adopted political and regulatory policies that were 
favorable to growth.47 The competition among jurisdictions for 
exports and growth encouraged active experimentation within 
each subnational unit, which facilitated policy innovation from 
the bottom up.48 Failed experiments were terminated either by 
the subnational government or through bankruptcy while suc-
cessful ones were scaled-up and imitated.49 
The above summary of federalism, Chinese style, suggests 
the importance of delegation of authority by the central govern-
ment in its efforts to launch the early stages of economic re-
form.50 In this period, local governments, not the central govern-
ment, undertook the major market-reform effort and engaged in 
 
 45. Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 63. Most provinces and cities at the 
margin retained 100 percent of local revenues or nearly so. Id.; see, e.g., Jean C. 
Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in 
China, 45 WORLD POL. 99, 103 (1992) (describing the advent of the revenue-
sharing process in China and how it allowed many localities to retain all, or 
most, of their revenue remainders). 
 46. Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 64. Generating a larger economy 
meant growing resources for subnational governments. The fiscal system there-
fore provided local governments with strong incentives to make economic reform 
succeed. 
 47. See id. at 73 (describing how successful experiments and policies were 
expanded). 
 48. See id. at 73–76 (demonstrating, through three cases, how experimen-
tation led to more effective market methods). 
 49. Id. at 73. Price reforms illustrate this kind of policy experimentation. 
“The dual price system was a common practice in China in the 1980s, with one 
planned price and another market price.” Id. at 62. For many goods, local gov-
ernments made the decision to move that good “from a dual price system to a 
single price system.” Id. Many governments used “their authority to pursue re-
form to liberalize the prices.” Id. In the case of grain prices, in 1992, Guangdong 
was the first province to liberalize it. Id. Guangdong’s success led many other 
provinces to follow suit. Id.  
 50. See SHIRK, supra note 1, at 127 (finding that, in order to work out eco-
nomic policies, higher political authorities will delegate to lower ones); Jin et 
al., supra note 39, at 1725 (finding central governments delegate “to local gov-
ernments because the later have better local knowledge”); Montinola et al., su-
 1572 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1563 
 
policy experiments on which the modern Chinese economy was 
built.51 This strategy of delegating reform authority proved ad-
vantageous to the central government for several reasons. First, 
no one knew in the beginning the best way to reform, and dele-
gation to provinces and lower governments allowed multiple and 
independent approaches and experiments.52 Once reform strat-
egies proved successful, they could be shared with and imitated 
by other local governments, initially allowing many provinces to 
adopt a wait-and-see approach. 53  Second, delegation afforded 
the central government the opportunity of blame-ducking—that 
is, to disassociate itself with failures if the reform experiments 
did not produce results.54 A massive failure to produce growth 
would likely have resulted in the reversal of delegation of au-
thority by the central government.55 Third, since the delegation 
was limited in scope, the central government was able to reap 
 
pra note 17, at 62 (stating many reform policies were delegated to local govern-
ments and provinces); Oi, supra note 45, at 102 (stating that the reforms had 
many objectives, some of which were to make local governments “fiscally self-
sufficient” and reduce the central government’s fiscal burden); Qian & 
Weingast, supra note 39, at 86 (“China has emphasized economic reform 
through devolution of authority from the central to local governments . . . .”); 
Weingast, supra note 40, at 22 (stating that China’s decentralization efforts “af-
ford[ ] local governments considerable discretion over economic policy”); Xu, su-
pra note 21, at 1100 (“Given that Chinese regions are alike in their economic 
compositions, which implies that shocks to regimes are highly correlated, by 
assigning similar tasks to regional officials and delegating power to them in 
order to carry out regional reforms, regional competition among them can serve 
as an effective incentive scheme.”). 
 51. See Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 74 (describing this process in 
Heilongjiang). 
 52. See SHIRK, supra note 1, at 336 (“Reforms were enacted in a gradual, 
piecemeal fashion, not according to a comprehensive plan.”). 
 53. See id. at 129 (describing the reformists as being “extremely cautious” 
and employing a slower approach, “taking one step forward and looking around 
before taking another” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 54. In China’s decentralized system, local officials often bear the blame for 
violating central spirits and policies. This explains the “hierarchical govern-
ment trust” among Chinese citizens, that is, citizens on average have more trust 
in central government than in local governments. See Lianjiang Li, Political 
Trust in Rural China, 30 MOD. CHINA 228, 232–33 (2004) (showing how three-
fourths of respondents of a survey of 1259 people trusted central government 
more than local government); Zhengxu Wang, Before the Emergence of Critical 
Citizens: Economic Development and Political Trust in China, 15 INT’L. REV. 
SOC. 155, 158 (2005) (stating that a survey conducted in China from 1999–2001 
found that “a total of 81 percent of the respondents expressed ‘relatively high’ 
or ‘very high’ levels of trust in the central government”). 
 55. See SHIRK, supra note 1, at 121 (finding that, in the 1980s, “[p]roblems 
that once were solved at lower levels” were escalated to higher levels of govern-
ment). 
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the economic benefits without losing political grip.56 The dele-
gated authority focused on economic reform and did not extend 
to political reform.57 Provinces did not in effect become new, in-
dependent nations, and their continued authority depended on 
the success of the reforms.58 
This important precedent helps us to understand the politi-
cal logic underlying law, Chinese style, which also involves im-
plicit delegation of authority from the central government. In 
both cases—federalism, Chinese style, and law, Chinese style—
delegation allowed actors other than the central government to 
engineer reform. Further, in both cases, the presence of compe-
tition—other subnational governments in the early reforms; 
other platforms in the current era—led these actors to provide 
institutional infrastructure for markets in the absence of a 
strong, state-run legal system. 
III.  TAOBAO AND LAW, CHINESE STYLE   
Recently, there has been an additional movement to develop 
institutional infrastructure for markets. We call this new effort 
law, Chinese style. Similar to the reform period during the 
1980s, law, Chinese style, also depends upon delegation.59 The 
difference is that in the present circumstances the central gov-
ernment has allowed specific private actors, rather than prov-
inces, to play a substantial role in the development of market 
infrastructure, especially, legal infrastructure. This develop-
ment is limited in scope and focuses on e-commerce.60 It also in-
teracts with the ongoing process in China aimed at producing 
elements of a body of e-commerce law.61 
 
 56. See id. at 117 (describing that “leaders loathe to lose the advantages of 
delegation” and “do not want to alienate their bureaucratic constituents”). 
 57. See id. at 118 (“The Chinese government has been making economic 
policies according to delegation . . . at least since the early 1980s.”). 
 58. See id. at 335 (finding that Chinese-style economic reform embodied the 
transferring of power from higher levels of government to lower levels, generat-
ing extensive economic growth). 
 59. See generally John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the 
Northeast Asian Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 111 n.24 
(2006) (noting that delegation of authority in investment law occurred in 
China). 
 60. See Jörg Binding & Kai Purnhagen, Regulations on E-Commerce Con-
sumer Protection Rules in China and Europe Compared—Same Same but Dif-
ferent?, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 186, 193 (2011) (“China 
. . . increasingly recognizes private regulatory mechanisms to govern the e-com-
merce market.”). 
 61. First, the state has incorporated components of Taobao’s platform rule 
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Importantly, law, Chinese style, serves as an alternative 
route to legal development that is much less politically con-
straining for the central government than the Western ap-
proach, and yet it is still effective to foster market growth. 
Taobao is one of those private actors that is in the process of de-
veloping a modern legal system that enforces contracts, resolves 
disputes, and prevents fraud. For all of its users, Taobao’s sys-
tem functions in places where the Chinese law is inadequate. 
A. EVOLUTION OF LAW, CHINESE STYLE 
Law, Chinese style, had emerged in the context of looming 
tensions between two primary stances of the Chinese govern-
ment: (1) an unwavering devotion to economic development,62 
and (2) an unremitting refusal to create the institutions typically 
associated with the rule of law.63 These two ideas conflict be-
cause, scholars argue, fostering long-term economic prosperity 
requires the rule of law.64 The rule of law as part of market in-
frastructure has come to matter more, especially as China’s 
 
into its own regulations on online trading. A case in point is its return policy, 
which gives consumers the right to return any commodities within seven days 
of receipt, without cause. This policy was first made and enforced by Taobao on 
its clothing category. Telephone Interview with a Taobao employee (June 1, 
2017). In 2014, this regulation was recognized as an industry standard, and 
written into Article 16 of The Administrative Measures for Online Trading re-
leased by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. Second, China 
Electronic Commerce Association (CECA)—a business alliance that represents 
the interests of e-commerce companies including Alibaba—was authorized by 
the state to complete one of the four draft proposals of the e-commerce law. See 
Qian Fang Li Zhu Ren Tan Dian Zi Shang Wu Fa: Yi Lie Ru 2016 Nian Li Fa 
Ji Hua (骞芳莉主任谈电子商务法：已列入 2016 年立法计划) [Director Fangli 
Qian Talked About the E-Commerce Law: It Has Been Included in the 2016 Leg-
islative Work Plan], MINISTRY COMM. CHINA (中华人民共和国商务部) (Mar. 14, 
2016), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/shangwubangzhu/201603/ 
20160301274283.shtml. The practice of allowing the business alliance to make 
a draft proposal of a national law is very rare in China. See Lizhi Liu, From 
Click to Boom: The Political Economy of E-Commerce in China (2018) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with authors). 
 62. Economic development has long been a key government priority, as it 
generates not only economic and fiscal resources but also performance-based 
legitimacy for the authoritarian state. See Hongxing Yang & Dingxin Zhao, Per-
formance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China’s Economic Miracle, 24 J. 
CONTEMP. CHINA 64, 82 (2015) (discussing how “the state’s performance-based 
legitimacy compels the government to keep its focus on promoting economic de-
velopment”). 
 63. See generally Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 59–64 (2001) (describing generally how China has instituted 
the rule of law in recent years). 
 64. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 
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economy has become more complex and integrated.65 This is be-
cause, first, China has gradually shifted away from a state-led, 
investment-driven economy.66 The rule of law helps consolidate 
a fair business environment for market economy to develop,67 
one with considerably less opportunism. Second, the lack of the 
rule of law disproportionately hurts the growth of private busi-
nesses (small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular), 68 
which constitute the main driver of China’s economic growth.69 
But, as we argued in Part I, the authoritarian government has 
been unwilling to establish a rule-of-law system, as a strong le-
gal system involves a variety of mechanisms that will inevitably 
limit the central government’s power.70 
In the absence of a strong public legal system, private actors 
have begun to provide substitutes. The central government has 
acquiesced to the authority exercised by private actors to create 
 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 111 (1990) (“We have long been aware that tax 
structure, regulations, judicial decisions, and statute laws . . . determine spe-
cific aspects of economic performance.”); Ronald Coase, The New Institutional 
Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72, 73 (1998) (finding that costs of exchange—
which specialization and the larger productivity of the economic system depend 
on—is rooted, in part, in the legal system); Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: 
The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Devel-
opment, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131, 149 (2004) (noting some scholars “argue that 
the legal system historically adopted in a country . . . has an important bearing 
on the development of institutions and hence on income levels”). 
 65. See id. at 63 (describing how China has created certain statutes “repre-
sent[ing] a concerted effort by the government to adopt a modern legal frame-
work to support a market economy”). 
 66. See SHIRK, supra note 1, at 335 (“[T]he Chinese strategy effectively 
moved the country from central planning to partial marketization.”). 
 67. See Orts, supra note 63, at 69 (“[China] has committed itself to a strong 
effort to establish a modern legal regime marked by relatively stable rules to 
allow China’s emerging market economy to flourish.”). 
 68. Too often these enterprises lack the resources and political ties to ad-
vance their interests. See Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: 
Political Connections and the Use of Courts Among Private Firms in China, 
76 J. POL. 318, 319 (2014) (finding that these firms traditionally depend on “per-
sonal ties with bureaucratic patrons for economic survival”). 
 69. See Zheng Song, Growing like China, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 196, 200–01 
(2011) (describing how private sector development has fueled China’s fast and 
stable growth). 
 70. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a Fundamental Cause 
of Long-Run Growth, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 385, 461 (Philippe 
Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005) (describing that repression “is still the 
preferred option for current political elites in China”); Douglass C. North & 
Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institu-
tions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. 
HIST. 803, 814–17 (1989) (describing the beginnings of the rise—and suprem-
acy—of the rule of law over the king during England’s Glorious Revolution). 
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markets with rule-of-law characteristics. An important feature 
of the delegation of the development of law, Chinese style, is that 
the reach of this law is limited in scope to the traditional areas 
of private law: property, contracting, and, perhaps, torts. The 
private provision of private law, therefore, allows the central 
government to foster experiments in law as it relates to the econ-
omy while lowering the probability that this form of legal system 
will challenge the central government in the area of public law, 
such as citizen rights. 
This implicit delegation helps conquer the technical com-
plexities in building a workable legal system. The current dele-
gation parallels the delegation of many reforms earlier in the 
process of marketization, such as allowing Guangdong Province 
to reform markets by being “one step ahead,” as we discussed in 
Part II. As with these earlier reforms, the central government’s 
delegation to create law also allows it to stand above the provi-
sion of services, in part, to allow multiple experiments and, in 
part, so that it is not directly responsible for any failures of the 
system. Delegation allows the central government to distance it-
self from any public dissatisfaction that may arise and, if need 
be, curtail failing experiments.71 Private actors, on the contrary, 
bear the risk of failure and buffer the tensions that could have 
been directed towards the state;72 but they also reap the profits 
if the experiments succeed. 
Enter Taobao. 
B. TAOBAO CREATES A MARKET 
Since its launching in 2003, Taobao has been growing at a 
stunning rate. By fiscal year 2016, Taobao has already hosted 
more than ten million active sellers and 423 million active buy-
ers.73 
 
 71. Compared with the previous delegation that typically occurred between 
the central government and the agents of the state (i.e., the provinces), delegat-
ing authority to private actors can distance the entire state from public dissat-
isfaction and political pressure. 
 72. For example, in 2010, around three hundred sellers initiated a physical 
protest against Taobao. They gathered in front of Alibaba’s headquarter in 
Hangzhou with banners. See Sellers Protest Against Taobao, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE (July 14, 2010), http://en.people.cn/90001/90778/90860/7065181.html 
(stating that protesters fought against new rules because the rules resulted in 
order losses and traffic plunges). 
 73. Press Release, Alibaba Group, Alibaba Group Announces December 
Quarter 2016 Results, at 31 (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ 
news/press_pdf/p170124.pdf; Press Release, Alibaba Group, Alibaba Group An-
nounces March Quarter 2016 and Full Fiscal Year 2016 Results, at 1 (May 5, 
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With respect to Gross Merchandise Value (GMV),74 Taobao 
currently surpasses Amazon and eBay combined.75 As of May 
2017, Rural Taobao—a rural expansion initiative—has also 
opened over 30,000 e-commerce service points in remote villages, 
many of which had no prior access to commercial parcel deliv-
ery.76 These service points afford access to those without online 
payment methods or who are not internet savvy.77 
The most fundamental service Taobao provides is access to 
a market supported by a private legal system in the process of 
developing the rule of law.78 Taobao has the means to create law, 
Chinese style, because it is a private supplier of legal infrastruc-
ture for its market and users when the state-run legal institu-
tions are weak.79 Of course, to gain the protection of this legal 
infrastructure, traders must join and trade using Taobao. For its 
users, Taobao can provide private institutions to enforce con-
tract, resolve disputes, and prevent fraud.80 Private legal insti-
tutions partially explain why platforms dominate e-commerce 
retailing in China but not in the United States. In the United 
States, where the strong legal environment makes the substitut-
ing effects of platforms less necessary, retailers can sell their 
goods and services directly through their own websites. But as 
we noted earlier, the absence of a legal system makes the same 
approach in China riskier. Consistent with this view, platforms 
in 2011 accounted for ninety percent of the e-commerce retailing 
 
2016), http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/press_pdf/p160505.pdf. 
 74. GMV is the total value of merchandise sold through an exchange site 
over a given period of time. It is a measure of the size of an online market. 
 75. See generally R. J. HOTTOVY ET AL., MORNINGSTAR EQUITY ANALYST 
REPORT: ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LTD (2015), https://invest.firstrade.com/ms/ 
equity_reports/sr/0P00013K81_20151009_RT.pdf (providing data and analyses 
of Taobao’s parent company). 
 76. See Nong Cun Tao Bao Fu Gai Yi Chao 3 Wan Ge Cun, Fan Xiang 
Chuang Ye Xian Gun Xue Qiu Xiao Ying (农村淘宝覆盖已超 3万个村, 返乡创业
现滚雪球效应) [Rural Taobao Has Covered over 30,000 Villages; Snowball Effect 
of Entrepreneurship Among Return Migrants], ALI RESEARCH INST. (阿里研究院
) (Mar. 21, 2017), http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xoYep2mtWmlXWUqZWzbLAg. 
 77. Each service point has a manager to help villagers conduct e-commerce. 
Villagers can buy and sell products through the manager ’s online account. They 
can also pay in cash when the products arrive at the store for pickup. In this 
way, the villagers who do not have online accounts or the technical know-how 
can use e-commerce. Information obtained from fieldwork in Donghan Village 
of Mengzhou, a county-level city of Henan Province, August 8, 2015. 
 78. Lizhi Liu & Barry R. Weingast, Law, Chinese Style: Solving the Au-
thoritarian’s Legal Dilemma Through the Private Provision of Law 13 (Aug. 
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See discussion in Part III.C. 
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market in China and only twenty-four percent of e-commerce re-
tailing in the United States.81 The demand for Taobao’s legal 
and trading services is bigger in China than it would be in a rule-
of-law country. 
C. TAOBAO’S PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEM 
We now draw on our earlier work82 to address how Taobao’s 
private legal system works in the absence of strong formal insti-
tutions administered by the state. Taobao’s private legal system 
is comprised of institutions that address various types of prob-
lems associated with market transactions. In this Section, we fo-
cus on how Taobao addresses three major problems intrinsic to 
trade: (1) contract enforcement; (2) fraud prevention; and (3) dis-
pute resolution. 
1. Contract Enforcement Through Institutionalized 
Reputation Mechanisms: The Online Rating System 
Traders throughout human history face a similar problem 
regarding contract enforcement known as the assurance prob-
lem; when trading parties strike a deal, how do they ensure that 
each party honors the agreed upon terms? The assurance prob-
lem is especially acute when an exchange is a two-step process 
in which one party to the contract has performed her obligations 
and awaits the second party to perform his. States in the devel-
oped West foster two complementary classes of mechanisms to 
enforce contracts. The first involves a legal system with the 
power to sanction individuals for breach of contract. The second 
involves reputation mechanisms whereby other market partici-
pants shy away from doing business with those individuals or 
firms who develop reputations for fraud, cheating, opportunistic 
behavior, et cetera. The threat of sanctions is therefore only one 
piece of contractual enforcement, and is not necessary for a legal 
system to prevent contractual problems.83 
Taobao’s online feedback and rating system is at the center 
of Taobao’s attempt to mitigate the assurance problem. As with 
 
 81. See Liu & Weingast, supra note 78, at 13. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Hadfield and Weingast explore these ideas in their What Is Law project. 
See Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Law Without the State: Legal At-
tributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment, 1 J.L. & 
CTS. 3 (2013); Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What Is Law? A Coor-
dination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 
(2012). 
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other online trading systems, such as eBay, Taobao’s rating sys-
tem creates incentives for all trades to maintain a good reputa-
tion.84 But Taobao’s system goes well beyond that used by eBay 
and Amazon. Taobao’s rating system consists of two main parts: 
(1) credit rating (a rating for buyer or seller over the entire past 
history); and (2) store rating (a rating for sellers).85 To capture 
the changing dynamics of service quality, Taobao uses store rat-
ing to complement credit rating for sellers.86 The store rating is 
based on three aspects of the seller over the past six months: 
(1) the accuracy of product description; (2) customer service; and 
(3) shipping time. 87  In addition to the overall reputation of 
sellers, buyers can also check all past reviews of each product.88 
Information about the reliability of trading partners is thus cen-
tral to policing Taobao’s market exchange system. 
Taobao’s fraud prevention program,89 which we will discuss 
next, allows users to have access to reliable information that ad-
dresses some of the fear inherent in commercial transactions. 
Further, relevant punishment is enforced through an escrow sys-
tem embedded in Alipay,90 which we discuss below. Because the 
Chinese legal system is weak and cumbersome, state-sponsored 
sanctions are not central to Taobao’s enforcement mechanisms. 
Taobao has therefore been forced to enhance the power of other 
forms of enforcement, such as Alipay and various forms of rat-
ings and reputation mechanisms. 
2. Fraud Prevention Through Risk Framework: Big Data, 
Manual Review and State Coercion 
Fraud must be limited, lest trade stalls. Fraud in online 
markets includes online payment fraud, account hacks, attempts 
to manipulate online reviews, and counterfeit products. 91  To 
 
 84. See Liu & Weingast, supra note 78, at 15. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. at 16. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. Nonetheless, the rating system still suffers from multiple limi-
tations. For example, sellers can manipulate reviews by placing fictitious orders 
to inflate ratings, or they can take fraudulent actions that hurt competitors’ 
reputations. 
 89. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 90. See infra Part III.C.4. 
 91. Jidong Chen et al., Big Data Based Fraud Risk Management at Alibaba, 
1 J. FIN. & DATA SCI. 1, 2 (2015). 
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help identify fraud, Taobao utilizes big-data analytics and man-
ual review to identify suspicious cases.92 Taobao’s system relies 
on a high volume and variety of information generated by the 
platform (e.g., user behavioral data, network data, delivery de-
tails, and IP addresses).93 The trove of proprietary data enables 
Taobao to use big-data models to detect suspicious activities and 
to counter fraud risks.94 Manual review assists big-data analyt-
ics. 95  For example, consider how this system would handle 
online payment fraud. Taobao uses five layers of checks to iden-
tify fraud beginning with account check—a process that lever-
ages big-data analytics to examine account information of both 
the seller and the buyer, including whether these accounts have 
exhibited suspicious activities—and ending with manual review, 
if necessary.96 
After detecting a case of fraud, Taobao can punish fraudu-
lent behavior through online and offline means. Online, Taobao 
can lower the user’s rating, make the fraudulent store unsearch-
able for a certain period, or, in extreme cases, ban the accounts.97 
A party who deems the judgment to be unfair can appeal to 
Taobao.98 Offline, Taobao has cooperated with the state police. 
For example, to combat counterfeit products fraud at its source, 
Taobao uses its massive datasets (e.g., shared phone numbers, 
chat histories, product return and delivery addresses) to track 
the location of offline warehouses and producers involved in 
counterfeiting. 99  Taobao has shared this location information 
with the police and has helped them arrest suspects who produce 
and sell counterfeits.100 In 2014 alone, Alibaba’s collaboration 
 
 92. See id. at 3–4. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id.  
 96. See id. Obvious fraud cases are immediately sent for auto-decision (i.e. 
machine automatically decides on the case). Id. at 4. If the case is suspicious 
but not obvious enough for auto-decision, the case will enter the next layer of 
checks. Id. From layer 1 to layer 4, the fraud risk management system checks 
different information of the transaction. Id. Borderline cases after four layers of 
checks are sent to the fifth layer, manual review, in which Taobao employees 
may phone the involved parties to get additional information. Id. 
 97. See Rules for Punishment, supra note 7. 
 98. Users can appeal to Taobao through the Complaint Center (申诉中心) 
in the Taobao system. 
 99. Taobao was able to track these producers because it has business con-
nections with its online sellers. 
 100. See Catherine Shu. Alibaba Removed 90M Suspicious Listings from Its 
Sites Before IPO, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.techcrunch.com/ 
2014/12/23/alibaba-listings-purge. 
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with the state enforcement agencies in over one thousand coun-
terfeiting cases led to the arrest of four hundred suspects and 
the shut-down of two hundred brick-and-mortar stores, ware-
houses or factories.101 Although the state apparatus suffers from 
many liabilities, such that it is slow, cumbersome, and can be 
highly corrupt, the state can help in punishment of the most 
egregious traders. 
3. Dispute Resolution Through Crowd-Sourcing Justice: User 
Dispute Resolution Center 
Dispute resolution is an indispensable aspect of a workable 
legal system. Every functioning market needs mechanisms to 
handle disputes. Taobao resolves two types of disputes: (1) dis-
putes between pairs of market participants (e.g., a seller and a 
buyer; or two competitors); and (2) disputes between market par-
ticipants and Taobao, as embodied in its function as market own-
ers or regulators. When a dispute occurs, the party initiating the 
case may choose from two channels: (1) asking a designated 
Taobao employee to adjudicate, or (2) using a jury-like panel of 
public assessors to arbitrate. 102  Launched in 2012, Taobao’s 
User Dispute Resolution Center, which we call a jury-like system, 
has been crowd-sourcing minor, everyday disputes to an online 
panel of jurors.103 Most of these disputes are of two types: (1) 
buyer-seller disputes, which often involve contract violations 
(e.g., complaints about items received that fail to match store 
descriptions); and (2) platform-seller disputes in which a seller 
believes that Taobao has unfairly penalized it for violating cer-
tain rules.104  
In the jury system, Taobao chooses thirteen public assessors 
randomly from a pool of nearly two million volunteers.105 Taobao 
selects these assessors from experienced users who have volun-
teered to serve.106 Qualified candidates for the public-assessor 
 
 101. See id. 
 102. Telephone Interview with a Taobao employee, supra note 61. 
 103. Jim Erickson, How Taobao Is Crowdsourcing Justice in Online Shop-
ping Disputes, ALIZILA (July 17, 2014), http://www.alizila.com/how-taobao-is 
-crowdsourcing-justice-in-online-shopping-disputes. 
 104. Telephone Interview with a Taobao employee, supra note 61. 
 105. In 2016, the total number of jurors for a panel was reduced from thirty-
one (sixteen votes will win the case) to thirteen (seven votes will win the case). 
Id. 
 106. See Tao Bao Jiao Yi Yin Ru Da Zhong Ping Shen Yuan Ji Zhi (淘宝交
易引入大众评审员机制) [Taobao Transactions Introduced the System of Public 
Assessors], HANGZHOU DAILY (杭州日报) (Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Taobao 
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pool must have high reputations based on Taobao’s system of 
rating.107 The public assessors’ principal responsibility is to re-
view the evidence submitted by disputing parties and then vote 
within forty-eight hours.108 The public assessors decide which 
party wins by a simple majority vote. 109  This system allows 
Taobao to address a large and growing number of complaints. As 
of March 29, 2018, 2,028,307 public assessors have resolved 
2,632,553 disputes in total.110 
Importantly, Taobao has several means of enforcing deci-
sions from both employee adjudicators and public accessors. 
Taobao can freeze the payment in dispute, take money from the 
store deposit (for sellers only), lower the rating of the users in-
volved, or deny the losing party’s privileges to use the plat-
form.111 
4. Supporting Institutions: Payment and Escrow 
“Taobao’s private legal system . . . relies on several support-
ing institutions. Although these institutions do not specifically 
address any of the major issues in trade (i.e., contract, fraud, and 
dispute), they ensure that platform rules are interconnected, 
adaptable, and easier to enforce.”112 Alipay, in particular, is an 
important part of the Taobao system.113 Alipay provides online 
payment and escrow services.114 Alipay works similarly to Pay-
Pal, except that Alipay also provides escrow service.115 Escrow 
 
Transactions], http://hzdaily.hangzhou.com.cn/hzrb/html/2013-12/31/content_ 
1648670.htm. 
 107. See Ali Zhao Kai Hu Lian Wang Da Hui, Bai Wan Da Zhong Ping Shen 
Liang Xiang (阿里召开互联网志愿者大会，百万大众评审亮相) [Alibaba Held the 
Internet Volunteers Conference, Millions of Public Assessors Debut], IWANG-
SHANG (天下网商) (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.iwshang.com/Post/Default/Index/ 
pid/247679.html. 
 108. See Taobao Transactions, supra note 106. 
 109. Communication is prohibited between disputing parties and the anon-
ymous assessors as well as among assessors. Assessors also provide written 
comments about this case. If unsatisfied with the jury decision, a disputing 
party can request Taobao employees to intervene and reexamine the case. Tel-
ephone Interview with a Taobao employee, supra note 61. 
 110. Ali Da Zhong Ping Shen (阿里大众评审) [Alibaba Public Assessors], 
TAOBAO (淘宝), http://pan.taobao.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 111. Telephone Interview with a Taobao employee, supra note 61. 
 112. See Liu & Weingast, supra note 78, at 20–21 (discussing two additional 
mechanisms: sesame credit scores and the House of Representatives, a system 
that allows qualified users to participate in rule changes). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. at 16. 
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service means that the buyer’s payment for each order is held by 
Alipay until the goods are received, and the funds are released 
only when both trading parties are satisfied with the transac-
tion.116 
While Alipay does not enforce contracts on its own, its es-
crow service enhances Taobao’s enforcement capability. Alipay 
can directly freeze or deduct from the money that a user has in 
her account if she violates platform rules.117 When a dispute over 
a trade arises, Alipay can freeze the payment in escrow, forcing 
feuding parties to choose between losing the money or engaging 
in, and complying with, Taobao’s dispute resolution system.118 
Thus, Alipay supports Taobao’s legal system because it provides 
a means of enforcement of decisions and a means of forcing peo-
ple to operate within the system. 
IV.  TAOBAO AND THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERALISM, 
CHINESE STYLE: RECENTRALIZATION   
The preceding Parts allow us to draw a parallel between 
law, Chinese style, and federalism, Chinese style. Both ap-
proaches involve delegation of central government authority to 
particular domestic actors with a limited scope; both serve as in-
stitutional bases for markets in a weak-rule-of-law environment; 
and both induce the domestic actors to experiment with policies 
and rules that can help foster growth. 
Despite the similarities between federalism, Chinese style, 
and law, Chinese style, the two sets of delegation differ consid-
erably in how they affect the national common market. Taobao 
has helped foster a common, national market, which did not hap-
pen in the initial model of federalism, Chinese style.119 Earlier 
reform efforts did not support the national market because the 
central government was unable or unwilling to ensure the mo-
bility of factors (such as capital and labor) and products across 
regions.120 First, federalism, Chinese style, was an entirely of-
fline movement.121 Second, as we will argue in this Part, local 
 
 116. See id. 
 117. Telephone Interview with a Taobao employee, supra note 61. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 65–66 (describing that the failure 
in the common market condition leads to a scenario in which local governments 
erect trade barriers). 
 120. See id. (providing examples of obstacles to internal factor mobility). 
 121. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (comparing Chinese federal-
ism to nineteenth-century federalism in the United States). 
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governments are less able to resist and reverse a common mar-
ket achieved online than one formed offline. This Taobao-in-
duced process of market integration has political implications. 
Because Taobao has provided a potential instrument for the cen-
ter to strengthen its ability to monitor and discipline local pow-
ers, it may influence the power balance between the central and 
local governments in favor of the former. 
A. DECENTRALIZATION AND THE INCOMPLETE COMMON MARKET 
Since its inception, federalism, Chinese style, has lacked a 
common market, because the Chinese national government does 
not have an effective means to police the internal common mar-
ket—that is, to ensure the mobility of goods and factors across 
subnational jurisdictions.122 The absence “explains in part why 
many local governments have focused on trade barriers and ag-
gressive antimarket policies within their jurisdiction.”123 Alter-
natively stated, decentralization of authority creates the incen-
tives and political means for the local governments to erect trade 
barriers. In the absence of an effective central means to contain 
local protectionism, many problems occur, including localized 
corruption and patronage networks and beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies.124 This is especially true of interior provinces that have 
had only limited participation in reform and exports.125 
The common-market condition is difficult to achieve. While 
the central government retains important personnel control over 
local governments,126 local governments can resist a common 
market through multiple means: for example, (1) by not fully im-
plementing central policies (such as policies in which the local 
governments are the main enforcers);127 and (2) by misrepre-
senting the information about central policy implementation (be-
 
 122. See id. at 55 (describing national authority to ensure factor mobility as 
a “principal characteristic” of “market-preserving federalism”). 
 123. Id. at 53. 
 124. See id. at 58 (“Market-preserving federalism . . . diminishes the preva-
lence of rent-seeking and patronage systems.”); Xu, supra note 21, at 1134 
(“[P]rotectionism can eventually lead to serious political problems, such as dis-
integration of the country.”). 
 125. See Xu, supra note 21, at 1137 (discussing growing urban-rural dispar-
ities that some attribute to decentralization). 
 126. See id. at 1082. 
 127. See id. at 1095 (describing local government discretion in policy imple-
mentation). 
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cause, for example, local governments enjoy information ad-
vantages over the center).128 
Federalism in China has not guaranteed a common market. 
In a decentralized fiscal and economic system, local governments 
have to compete for scarce capital and labor and for fiscal reve-
nues.129 In addition, provinces in China have had to compete for 
business on the international market, as the Chinese economy 
has long been export-driven.130 These two sources of political 
and economic competition—among lower jurisdictions and on 
the international market—have generated the incentives for 
China’s economic growth; they have also created problems for 
the rise of a national common market.131 In the absence of a cen-
tral authority to ensure factor mobility, decentralization may, in 
fact, hinder the creation of a common market, putting economies 
of scale in peril. 
B. TAOBAO AND THE FORMATION OF A COMMON MARKET 
While the central government in China has struggled to cre-
ate and support a national market, Taobao has been able to fos-
ter a common market for the exchange of certain products and 
services. Taobao’s system facilitates market integration for two 
reasons. First, Taobao lowers the entry barrier to the national 
market, facilitating interprovincial trade. In particular, it allows 
small or rural sellers and buyers to participate in the national 
market, access that they otherwise would not enjoy in the offline 
setting.132 This development parallels the access to markets in 
mid- and late-nineteenth-century United States when mail-or-
der catalogs greatly expanded rural citizens’ access to consumer 
goods, and at far lower prices. 133  Second, Taobao has strong 
 
 128. See id. at 1079. 
 129. See Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 58. 
 130. See id. at 76–77 (discussing examples of competition among regional 
governments). 
 131. Id. at 59. 
 132. The “Rural Taobao” Program aims to grant e-commerce access to one 
thousand counties and one-hundred thousand villages in the next three to five 
years. Make a Better Rural China, ALIBABA GRP., http://www.alibabagroup.com/ 
en/ir/pdf/160614/09.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). By the end of March 2016, 
the project had covered 14,000 villages. ALIBABA GRP. HOLDING LTD., ANNUAL 
REPORT 60 (Form 20-F) (2016). 
 133. See DAVID BLANKE, SOWING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HOW CONSUMER 
CULTURE TOOK ROOT IN THE RURAL MIDWEST 186 (2000) (describing mail-order 
catalogs’ role in integrating rural consumers into the mass market); CHANDLER, 
supra note 15 at 209, 230–33 (same). 
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vested interests in keeping the platform free of trade and regu-
latory barriers across regions, so as to facilitate market ex-
change.134 No matter whether a seller or buyer lives in Beijing 
or Tibet, she is governed by the same set of platform rules. 
As a result, Taobao facilitates the cross-regional mobility of 
goods and capital. It intensifies national economic competition, 
and it breaks down monopolies, such as physical stores benefit-
ing from geographical isolation and internal trade barriers.135 
All of this creates a virtuous circle. The larger market increases 
the demand for market infrastructure, such as roads, power 
plants, railway lines, electric power, and so on.136 The improve-
ment of infrastructure, in turn, facilitates the rise of a national 
common market. 
Local governments have limited means to resist or reverse 
these advances in the common market achieved by online ex-
change. First, Taobao’s private market infrastructure is inde-
pendent of those provided—or restrained—by local govern-
ments. Taobao’s system is largely self-sufficient.137 Even if local 
governments want to intervene and regulate the online market, 
they need to first address a coordination problem among them-
selves. For example, consider a situation where a seller lives in 
Beijing, her factory is in Hebei, and she has a dispute on Taobao 
with a buyer in Guangdong. Which local government should take 
the lead to address the dispute, and how do they coordinate with 
the other local governments who may or may not agree with the 
lead government’s decisions?138 This confusion makes it difficult 
for provinces to hinder or restrict Taobao. 
 
 134. Cf. Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 65 (describing how regional pro-
tection impedes the exchange of manufactured goods). 
 135. Facing strong competition from online stores, the physical stores that 
previously benefited from geographical isolation can no longer reap monopoly 
rents. Again, this is analogous to the development of mail-order catalogs in the 
nineteenth-century United States. See CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 233 (de-
scribing rural retailers’ opposition to legislation that would advantage mail-or-
der catalogs). 
 136. As Taobao fosters market development—for example, by lowering the 
costs of production in rural provinces—it facilitates the growth of enterprises 
seeking to participate in markets beyond their locality. As more enterprises par-
ticipate in the national market, and as more commodities are exchanged nation-
wide, there will be a greater demand for infrastructure. See Montinola et al., 
supra note 17, at 58 (noting that a national market promotes competition, in-
ducing regional jurisdictions to provide infrastructure). 
 137. See supra Part III.C. 
 138. This problem is actually a consequence of federalism. For example, the 
railroads raised similar problems with regulation in the nineteenth-century 
American common market. See ELY, supra note 15, at 90–93 (discussing the 
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Additionally, Taobao creates an information barrier for local 
governments. Local governments have scant information about 
the online market,139 and they do not have sufficient power to 
bargain for full information against a transcendent platform. For 
example, if local governments do not know who within their ju-
risdictions is selling and buying, those transactions are difficult 
to tax and regulate. This lack of information makes it difficult 
for local governments to tax and regulate online platforms. 
Taobao’s market platform therefore seems a potentially im-
portant mechanism for improving the common market. Because 
local governments have great difficulty regulating national mar-
ket platforms, Taobao and similar platforms provide a means 
around internal trade barriers. The platforms may, therefore, al-
low a wide range of products to take advantage of economies of 
scale that trade barriers had prevented.140 Further, market ex-
change on platforms enhances interprovince competition.141 Lo-
cal firms, protected under internal trade barriers, often cannot 
survive competition in a common market.142 
C. TAOBAO AND RECENTRALIZATION 
As shown above, in its politically and economically decen-
tralized system, China’s central government has faced, and con-
tinues to face, difficulties in policing the internal common mar-
ket. But Taobao raises the possibility for the central government 
to use Taobao as an indirect means to monitor and discipline lo-
cal governments. 143  Indeed, Taobao and its parent company, 
Alibaba, have started to collaborate with the central government 
on a variety of issues, including credit scoring, poverty reduction, 
 
origins of federal railroad regulation). 
 139. Interview with a City Government Official, Suzhou City, Jiangsu Prov-
ince (Aug. 26, 2014); Interview with a Township Government Official, Shaji 
Township, Jiangsu Province (Aug. 26, 2014). 
 140. See Barry R. Weingast, Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: The Im-
plications of Fiscal Incentives, 65 J. URB. ECON. 279, 281 (2009) (noting the role 
of trade barriers in hindering factor mobility). 
 141. See id. at 281–82 (describing the benefits of competition between sub-
national governments). 
 142. See id.; cf. Montinola et al., supra note 17, at 66 (noting that, in the 
absence of trade barriers, market pressure makes it difficult to sustain local 
governments’ corrupt activity). 
 143. Two assumptions underlie this suggestion: (1) central and local govern-
ments are in a constant tug-of-war over information and power; and (2) because 
Taobao prefers large to small markets, it favors collaborating with the center 
against local authorities, rather than the other way around. See infra note 144. 
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and e-government.144 
Taobao helps strengthen central authority in three ways. 
First, as a powerful, centralized tool of collecting market infor-
mation, Taobao can reduce, and even reverse the information 
disadvantage of the central government, which has limited in-
formation about economic activity. In the past, the central gov-
ernment has had to rely on economic data provided by the local 
governments, but local governments are known for faking eco-
nomic numbers.145 Online transaction data, in contrast, can pro-
vide a real-time, objective barometer about a region’s economic 
vitality. For example, Alibaba invented Alibaba Shopping Price 
Index (aSPI), an index based on the price changes of a particular 
basket of goods and services.146 The index can be used as an al-
ternative to the central government’s consumer price index to 
reflect real-time inflation and price fluctuations.147 Increasingly, 
there will be more data collaboration between Alibaba and the 
central government, including the establishment of a national 
credit-information-sharing platform.148  
Second, Taobao helps enforce central policies and provide 
public goods, including poverty alleviation and rural develop-
 
 144. For collaboration on credit scoring, see Guo Jia Fa Gai Wei Yu Alibaba 
Gong Jian Shang Wu Ling Yu Cheng Xin Ti Xi Jian She (国家发改委与阿里巴巴
共建商务领域诚信体系建设) [National Development and Reform Commission 
Works with Alibaba Jointly To Establish a Credit Rating System in the Com-
mercial Area], CHINA ECON. NET (中国经济网) (Dec. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission], http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/ 
gdxw/201612/02/t20161202_18347172.shtml. For collaboration on poverty re-
duction, see Julie Makinen, Chinese E-Commerce Giant Alibaba Connects Rural 
Residents to Online Shopping, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes 
.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-rural-economy-20160403-story.html (describing 
government financial support for Alibaba’s rural expansion). For e-government, 
see Huanqiu Tech, Chinese Central Government Procurement Platform Uses 
Alibaba Cloud, MARBRIDGE DAILY (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www 
.marbridgeconsulting.com/marbridgedaily/2015-03-10/article/81778/chinese_ 
central_government_procurement_platform_uses_alibaba_cloud. 
 145. See Jeremy L. Wallace, Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information 
Problems in China, 46 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 11, 12–13 (2016) (“Sub-national leaders 
may be rewarded on the basis of manipulated data, since monitoring costs make 
it expensive . . . for central authorities to know the real situation . . . .”). 
 146. See The Price Changes in Online Shopping in December, 2015, ALI RES. 
INST. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.aliresearch.com/en/news/detail/id/20807.html. 
 147. Tom Orlik, Inflation Deflated? Evaluating the “Alibaba Index,” WALL 
ST. J.: CHINA REAL TIME REP. (May 20, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
chinarealtime/2013/05/20/inflation-deflated-evaluating-the-alibaba-index (com-
paring aSPI with China’s official consumer price index). 
 148. See National Development and Reform Commission, supra note 144. 
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ment. For example, the Rural Taobao Program subsidizes logis-
tics services to rural markets, and helps people in poor, rural 
areas sell agricultural products to urban consumers through 
sales on Taobao’s platform.149 This initiative was, in part, finan-
cially backed by the central government. By 2016, the Ministry 
of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance offered two hundred 
counties a total of $300 million for expenditures on e-commerce 
training, warehouses, and other related facilities and services 
that could advance the project.150 As of May 2017, Rural Taobao 
had opened e-commerce service points in over 30,000 villages, 
many of which had no access to commercial parcel delivery ser-
vices prior to its arrival.151 As the central government continues 
to rely on positive economic performance for its legitimacy, the 
prospect of bringing market infrastructure, markets, and jobs to 
rural areas furthers this government’s goals.  
Third, as discussed in Part IV.B, Taobao weakens the au-
thority, revenue, and rent-creation by local governments by 
breaking down internal trade barriers. It therefore has mixed 
effects on federalism. By bringing national markets to provinces 
with trade barriers, Taobao strengthens market-preserving fed-
eralism by contributing to the common market. Yet it has the 
opposite effect with respect to the power of the central govern-
ment vis-à-vis the provinces. 
  CONCLUSION   
We asked two questions at the outset: (1) What is the scope 
of Taobao’s law-creation? and (2) What effects is Taobao likely to 
have on federalism, Chinese style, and the common market? 
Online market platforms, such as Taobao, appear to be 
changing the politics, economics, and legal infrastructure of 
China. We argued that Taobao has created far more than an ex-
change system; it has created a national market platform, in-
cluding the market infrastructure necessary to sustain markets 
that the central government has found it difficult to provide. We 
called this phenomenon law, Chinese style.152 
 
 149. See Makinen, supra note 144 (“Government officials and Alibaba exec-
utives say Rural Taobao jibes neatly with national goals . . . .”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Nong Cun Tao Bao Zai Sheng Ji Kai Qi Nong Cun Dian Shang Xin Shi 
Ming (农村淘宝再升级开启农村电商新使命) [Rural Taobao Has Been Updated 
Again and Will Begin a New Mission on Rural E-Commerce], CHINA DAILY (中
国日报网) (May 30, 2017) http://caijing.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-05/30/content_ 
29547904.htm. 
 152. See supra Part III. 
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Law, Chinese style, has emerged because the central gov-
ernment in China has effectively delegated the authority to de-
velop this infrastructure to private parties. This delegation gives 
the central government several advantages: it provides an insti-
tutional basis for markets in a weak rule-of-law environment; it 
permits experimentation; and it also allows the central govern-
ment to distance itself from any failures. We drew connections 
between these benefits and the advantages that characterize fed-
eralism, Chinese style—one that existed during the early reform 
efforts in the 1980s and early 1990s.153 
But, unlike federalism, Chinese style, this new system of 
creating a national market through private online platforms 
seems to tip the power balance towards the central government, 
rather than the other way around. On the one hand, Taobao 
holds the potential to circumvent internal trade barriers be-
tween provinces by fostering a national online market. While the 
rise of a national common market is likely to generate substan-
tial economic growth,154 it has begun to challenge the regulatory 
power of local governments, as now many problems are no longer 
localized. On the other hand, the rise of national platforms such 
as Taobao seems to help reinforce the power of the central gov-
ernment. The central government can use national platforms as 
centralized tools to collect market information and to enforce 
central policies.155 
As Taobao grows, however, it will become a force that can 
potentially demand concessions from the central government. 
Were the central government to shut down and expropriate 
Taobao’s assets, it would face 400 million doomed citizens whose 
interests the government has trampled. Even if Taobao may not 
intend to challenge the central authority, its growing influence 
may invite unwanted suspicions from the latter. It is not at all 
clear whether these two parties will collaborate or end up in con-
flict. It is too early to tell whether these trends will continue and 
add up to something important and transforming. But law, Chi-
nese style, holds the potential for such a transformation. 
 
 153. See supra Part IV. 
 154. Taobao is likely to generate substantial economic growth in China 
through the sources first emphasized by Adam Smith, notably, through the pro-
cess of market integration and greater division of labor and exchange. See 
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 23, at 679–81 (predicting that China 
would have the capability “to support very great manufactures, and to admit of 
very considerable divisions of labour”). 
 155. See supra Part IV.C. 
